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Alen generation and c ~ Q i t  presentaaia issues for 
low-level wind shear (microburst) a l m  are 
investigated Alert generation issues center on 
development of a hazard criteria which allows 
in temon of both ground- 
s to form an accurate picture of 
sed by a particular 
logy for testing of 
through flight simulation has k e n  devel 
been used to examim the efktivemss and feasibiliity of 
several poss Also, an experiment to 
evaluate can cal cmkplt @lays for 
micmburst aierts using a piloted simulator has been 
bm 
Nomenclature 
eter (Qn. 1) 
lope indicaux devuon 
gravitational arceleration 
altitude 
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Low $ h u e  wbd shear is Ihe 
related cause of fatal aviation accidenrs in ehe U.S. 
Since 1964, there have k n  26 widen& arm.bu& to 
windshear resulbng in over 500 farali~es." l e  
h o r n  as miaobmB m 
The variety of systems urrder development for wind 
shear detectim and 
with the dvent of 
merhdology and (2) in 
presentation to fight crews. 
2. Background and Problem Definition 
2.1 Alert Generation 
Several low-level M shear detecri,on sysEms, 
, are currrentny 
nal or under d e v e l q m c  Tfne Termid 
WWR) sysrem is cumne8y 
under final stages of develognnent arPd is scwded fm 
inibal cleployment im 1992. The ]Low Level \iiih&hw 
Figure 1. Aircraft encounter d l h  a 
microburst on approach 
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a microburst on an arcraft trajectory were defined. The 
nominal conhtion was chosen to be a microburst 
encounter on final approach. In addition, it was 
assumed that the pilot or autopilot was unaware of the 
presence of the microburst, and hence attempted only to 
maintain the glidepath with a "normal" control 
strategy. This nominal case is used only to allow the 
n of hazard criteria under a consistent 
situation; it is intended that the results will be extended 
to include other situations such as takeoffs. 
For the nominal case (approach), either dropping 
below the glideslope or loss of 
considered hazardous c 
h combines both glideslope deviation and 
where dl,, = "dots" below glideslope 
In developing this measure, it was assumed that a 
critical situation develops if either (1) the aircraft drops 
two "dots" (0.7") below the glideslope*, or (2) the 
aircraft's 
either of 
The root-mean-square of the 
falling below the 
therefore a point measurement of the approach 
de on 
The angular error vs. glideslope measmment was 
chosen rather than altitude error to emphasize the 
greater danger due to being below glideslope at lower 
altitudes. Also, deviations above glideslope or velocity 
changes above trim are not included in the computation 
of AD; the terms inside the parentheses in the above 
equation can only take positive values. 
To evaluate the irnpact of the overall windf~eld on 
is integrated over the entire 
I "microburst impact" 
over entire approach 
(2) 
- 
* Two "dots" of glideslope deviation means that the 
pilot's glideslope deviation indicator has reached full scale 
in thd low direction, which is the equivalent of falling 0.7' 
below the 3" glideslope as measured from the runway 
threshold. 
A series of aircraft simulation runs were perfom&. 
using this nominal condttion and a series of high- 
resolution modeled microbmt windfields. The value of 
the microburst impact parameter was com;puted for each 
run. A set of possible microburst hazard crrite& were 
then computed for each of the modeled winGelcds. The 
linear correlation coefficient be 
criteria and the microburst imp 
because it is 1) desirable for simplicity in applying rhe 
criterion and 2) easily evaluated by computing 
the correlation coefficient. Two complete sets of runs 
were performed. using the same windfiel&, but Merent 
autopilot models, in order to show the insensitivity of 
this analysis to the control strategy employed. 
3 . 2 .  Candidate Hazard Criteria 
The following set of hazard criteria w:as chosen for 
examination in the simulation runs. 
1) Total divergence, AU meadwind-to-tailwid shear 
across the event) 
2) Mean shear. AUIAR, defined as toad divergence 
divided by the shear 
between the headwind and tailwind peals) 
3) Peak F-factor (de 
4) Largest F-factor r a given b m c e  
t lengths were ksted) 
F-factor over a given ~dismce 
foot lengths were 
The total divergence, as mentioned above, is the 
criterion currently used in TDWR operational 
evaluations for both alert thresholds and initensity 
reporting. A measurement of greater than 30 ho t s  
triggers a micrhmt alert ( ~ h  
as an "X knot loss") and a 
measurement of than 20 but less than 30 knots 
is given as "wind shear with loss.* Mean1 shear is an 
alternative criterion, which could be easily compuM 
from TDWR measurements' it is obtained by divihg 
the divergence value by the distance , a m =  which 
it is measured. 
The "F-factor" criterion, p r q &  b 
researchers at NASA Langley Research Centerro. is 
based on the impact of a microburst windt? e 
total energy (kinetic plus potential) of the It b 
a direct measure of the loss of Vential rat(:-of-clhb 
(or loss of effective thrust-to-weight ratio) due to the 
f dynamics. The data usad @rovided by NASA 
, the Langley Research Center. 
was for a Boeing 737- 100 
linear curve fits for CL an 
of mo~on is a v w l e  in References 10 and 11. of-attack. flap position, and gear position. 
L L o s a  - - gsiny - W,cosy - WhsiV 
(3) m m (4) 
F-fxlor is a natural measurement for reactive f = ~ [ ~ i n a  + I - gcosy + ~ , s i n y  - H ~ ~ C O ~ ]  V m m ised on i (5)  
stems under dev x = v cosy+ w, (6) 
compuring; it from the temperature gradient sensed 
dong h e  (&raEr flight path.1° TDWR. however. must 6 = v sin + wh infer F since the vextical winds cannot be directly (7) 
&auld cfft&on 4 is cmputed by talung the 
the rneswd F ex 
mfid distance. Since F is an instantaneous 
meamrnenr, &ng the maximurn F over a distance is 
simda to rm lintemtion and in&cates the magnitude of 
over that distance. Similarly, 
3,3  Aircraftllblierobursl Interaction 
Simiulalion 
The & d t / m i c r o b t  interaction sirnulation 
F i p  2) ,was based on long 
~ ~ o n s  of molion in wind axes, which allows fight 
in a vertical plane only with no shon-pe~d  pirching 
CL = f (a. flaps, gear position) (9) 
CD = f (a, flaps, gear position) (10) 
and flight 
path angle was then designed for this model. This 
inner-loop conmuer m k  
proportional-plus-intern 
addition. an outer loop w 
angle to m k  the glideslqpe. Two versions of the 
outer loop (glideslv =king) compensatm were used. 
the "fast" conaoller had a nanrral muency of 0.4 
rwsec. 
Figure 2. Simulation Block Diagram 
The Ihe6eld c i a  used was geWA b~ the A , 
T e m d  Area SirPlula~on Sysem (TASSjl , and 1s a 
sirnulation of a complex multiple microburst event 
1988. This event 
of five aircraft to 
tirnes during this event was available, and 12 paths 
through various parts of the windf~eld at various times 
were selected for analysis. These paths all penetrate the 
approximate center of at least one microburst, and vary 
L) from 42 to 70 hots. 
&om peak headwind 
vary from 6592 feet 
one of the horizontal 
velocity fields from the TASS model, and some of the 
paths used for the apprcraches. 
A typical microblnst win&eld (as encountered in 
one of the simulation runs) is shown in Figure 4. The 
fmt e x o u n m  a perfmance- g 
. This is followed by a down a rapid 
d to tailwind. both of which 
tend to drive the below glideslope and reduce 
se effects axe aggravated if the pilot or 
ware of the microburst. and reduces 
e headwind won of the event to 
Figure 3. TASS windfield lor 7/11/88 at 
2212.75 UTC. This is a vector plot of 
the horizontal plane at 27 1 feet AGL. 
The lines indicate some of the paths used in 
the sirnulation ~ u n s  (windfields 2. 3. and 5 ) .  
For each windfield. an app.mh was ma& such 
maximum thrust-to-weight ratio of app~,xim;aEly 
0.17. As stated above, it is important to note that h e  
assumption was made that the pilot or at~topiloa was 
nce of the microbursit. and heme 
attempted only to maintain the glideph with a 
"nomal" control strategy. 
The actual simulation was run on a :Sun 3W0 
workstation using MIA x SYSTEM-,BmD 
by Integrated Systems. IRC. The alriru& and 
histories for a sample run are p resen~d  in 
Figure 5. 
I 
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Figure 4. A typical microburst wiind preEnle. 
These Winds were encounted by the 
air& drnring one of the simulated 
approaches. 
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Figure 5. Sample altitude and airspeed 
histories for a simulation run 
3.4 Results and Discussion 
The criteria which showed the best carrelation 
(p > 0.81) for this set of runs were mean shear, largest 
F excesded over 1500 or 3000 feet, and largest mean F 
t. The peak F-factor along the 
mla tes  very v l y .  This is 
Table 1. Correlation coefficients between 













Correlafiorn coefficient. p 
0.486 
logical, since the distance over which critical values of 
were experienced was generally less 
than 6000 feet. Total divergence, the criterion currently 
used by T D W .  did not ccxrelate very well 
(p = 0.486). A comparison of the divergence and mean 
shear results is shown in Figure 6. 
The effectiveness of mean shear (over 
divergence) is not s g, since the wind shear 
threat is due to loss gy from b t h  q i d  change 
in horimnral wind velocity and fkm vertical wind 
velocity (downdraft). The mean shear criterion is an 
improvement over divergence in two ways: 1) it 
and therefa the m m  
m e  fashion for the 
The varying results for the cri 
blem with using ment 
. Clearly, F must be significant over 
however. have m e  
given microburst. Since this is not the case. 
measuringlaveraging F over a dis 
effective saategy , yielding sane 
integrated energy loss as well as 
problem lies in selection of the a 
length (for criterion 4) or averag 
criterion 5). Results for several of the F-based &teria 
are shown in Figure 7. 
Divergence (knots) 
Mean Shear (llsec) 
Figure 6. Microburst impact parameter vs 
divergence and mean shear hazard 
criteria 
For the "largest F exceeded" criterion, U)o feet 
proved to be the best distance, although 1500 and 4500 
foot distances also gave good correlation. Using the 
averaging technique, it was found that all the distances 
tested worked fairly well, with the best results for 4500 
feet. Neither of these criteria were very sensitive to the 
distance chosen. The "largest F exceededn criterion 
produced better results for the shorter distances, and is 
simpler to evaluate, which indicates that it may provide 
g when used with an airborne 
look-ahead sensor. It is important to note, however, 
that the results for the different distances are most 
likely somewhat dependent on the model windfield 
used. Also, the advantage of criterion 4 over criterion 5 
is not very significant in view of the limited number of 
runs performed. 
Peak F 
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Figure 7. Microburst impact parameter vs. 
several F-based hazard criteria 
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Figure 8. Microburst irnpact parameter for 
each windfield, for two different 
glideslope controllers 
In oader to examine the effects of control strategy 
on the above results, an additional set of runs was 
N m e d ,  using the "fast" glideslope conBoUer with 
the m e  windZields. This faster conmller resulted in 
lower values of J for all of the appmches (Figure 8). 
However, the correlation coefficients for the 
crrireh were not significantly different than om 
the f i t  set of runs (Table 2). This indicates that, 
d h u g h  the final magnitude of J (and hence the hazard) 
& p n &  on the control strategy employed hazard 
. . 
which comlate well with the rnicrobmt impact 
re]: for one conlrol sgategy will stiU correlate 
another saakgy. A sirnilar effect wollld be 
with differing 
wdma.8lace capab~ties. 
Table 2. Correlation coellicients lor runs 
with "fast" glideslope controller 
3,s Analysis Limitations 
Befoxe h k n g  conclusions EKKn the above 
d y s i s ,  rome hitations should be discussed. The 
most hp~rbant is that all the rnicroburst windfields 
andyxd r m e  h m  a single day (in fact, all within 10 
finuks) tiue to the b t e d  amount of high-resolution 
mfiekd mdel data a-ble. Although a fairly well 
&WiibutecI set of microbut inensiities and sizes were 
avdable in this data set, the results may be biased by 
some feature of the TASS model or by characteristics 
particular to the meteorological conditions on the day 
simulated This analysis will be extended to include 
additional data sets as they become available. 
A further limitation is the use of a single aircraft 
model of a fairly small transport aircraft. Use of a 
different msport aircraft model or a different pilot or 
autopilot model would clearly result in different values 
of J. The higher-bandwidth conml strategy, for 
example. lowered the final J value for all runs. This 
did not however, sipificantly alter the correlation 
results, since the difference in approach m k h g  due to 
the different control strategy was roughly the same for 
all microburst encounters. Using a different transport 
t mdel would have a similar effect. It is also 
Interesting to note that the only control aadeoff 
control or altitude 
includes both of these 
dscussed previously, these results are specific to the 
nominal case chosen (apprwh), and need to be 
extended to cover takeoff situations as well. 
In addition, the evaluation of the h 
not include measurement limitations. For example, the 
measurement of divergence 
AGL was done to "sirnulate 
TDWR. but does not accoun 
such as averaging across the 
example. Similarly. F was taken from the aircraft 
history after the sirnulati 
tion of a fmard-1 
sensing system. 
Finally, it should be noted that in some past wind 
shear related accidents (the crash of Delta 19 1 at DFW 
in 1985, for example) there were shoni-scale pitching 
and rolling motions of large enough amplitudes to 
considerably affect the controllability and w m a n c e  
of the aircraft. The di s which c a d  these 
oscillations are not ge cluded in windshear 
models (due to their small length scales) and are not 
visible in dual or briple doppler radar wind 
measurements (due to fmite resolution). These 
d~stuhances are also not included in J or in any of the 
cri 
3 .6  Implementation Issues 
The second requirement for a good 
as stated in Sectlon 2.1. is that it must be measureable 
by the available wind shear sensors. Based on the 
correlation coefficients, mean shear and largest F-factor 
exceeded over 3000 feet were the best criteria For a 
ground-based radar like TDWR, which cannot directly 
measure vertical velocity and hence cannot directly 
measure F, mean shear is a natural measurement. The 
TDWR system currently generites accurate values of 
both divergence and shear distance. Airborne in 
systems now under development measure a temperature 
pdient  at some point ahead of the aircraft, which is 
converted to a point measurement of F. Using the F- 
based criterion would be natural in this case, since the 
F-over-a-distance alert criterion reduces to the IR 
system sensing an F above a r a 
designated period of time. C 
sensors measure F through a low-pass filter. which is 
similar to averaging F over a distance. Clearly the 
measurement technique used has a strong bearing on 
which hazard criterion is appropriate. 
Once the criterion has been established. the 
question that remains to be answered is: what value of 
the hazard criterion should trigger an alert? This 
question is difficult, since it requires evaluation of how 
much wind shear hazard is "acceptable" and how much 
is a threat. The analysis technique used above cannot 
answer this question. criteria evaluated 
different microbursts will indicate which one is a 
t, but will not indicate that both might be 
a heavily loaded airclaft with a low excess 
ght ratio, while neither may be hazardous 
to a nearly empty aircraft. Alternatively, two aircraft 
with different autopilots (or with two pilots of differing 
skill) might exhibit a similar difference in hazard 
threshold. A margin of safety must be included in 
def~~lition f the alerting threshold, and all classes of 
which the alert will be issued need to be 
4. Planned Piloted Simulator Study 
4 .1  Goals 
The goal of this study is to evaluate candidate 
graphical cockplt displays for wind shear (microburst) 
alerts on equipped with an Electronic Flight 
Instrumentation System (EFIS). For this evaluation, 
graphical microburst alerts will be displayed on the 
Electronic Horizontal Situation Indicator (EHSI), a 
moving-map type navigational display. 
ent is designed to evaluate the 
following: 
1) General pilot reactions to the use of the EHSI 
for microburst alert presentation and to some 
baseline graphical -lay formats 
2) The effect of displaying either only " ' h t e n i n g "  
microbursts or both threatening and less linens 
microbursts on pilot decision making andmissed 
approach planning 
3) The effect of reflectivity on pilot decision- 
making (i-e. will the subjects react differenlly to 
"dry" microburst events than to "wet" even@) 
4) Pilot reaction to presenting "fused alerts (where 
the sensors used are not evident) vs. presenhg 
discrete alerts (where a different rep~senlalion is 
used for airborne sellson than for ground-based 
sensors) 
5) The proximity to a h at which the subjec~ 
feel a missed approach must be initiated. 
The results of this evaluation will be used to 
determine critical design items for implementdon of 
integrated graphical wind shear alerts. 
4.2  Experirllental Methodology 
ent will be performed with the MTT 
Advanced Cockpit Simulator. a part-task simukbon of 
an advanced transport aircraft equipped with both an 
EFIS and a Flight magement Computer {(FMC). 
The simulator. an upgraded version of that used in the 
modes of presentation comparison discus& in Section 
2.2. includes all primary electronic flight displays, 
display controls. autoflight systems, and a 1)artiA 
simulation of the FMC. 
A sample candidate ENS1 display format for 
microburst alerts is shown in Figure 9. Remokly 
as solid red chles or 
e microburs8 are 
being detected is transparent to the pilot on thL 
display; an alternative display in which airbt~me remote 
sensor information is distinguished firom ground-b& 
information will also be tested. Reactive ale*, 
triggered by penetration of a microburst event, will be 
cfisplayed as a flashing red circle directly aroiund the 
"ownship" symbol. In one methodology, only 
microbursts which have been judged " 
displayed. Another display option is to also show 
"secondary" events, which are meas& m s  of vvind 
shear (weak microbmts) which do not excetd tl?e 
hazard threshold. These could be displayed as open mJ 
s to distinguish then1 &om 
The: evaluation will be performed in two different 
s e b g s :  1) static display presentarion, and 2) real-time 
hes. The static @lay presentation 
will be ~ ~ s e d  to obtain pilot input on the general display 
fomar and dqlay options in a non-flying situation. 
The sisnulated apmches  will test the display in flight 
siwtions. A set of scenarios have been designed to 
o b h  both quantitative data and pilot opinions on each 
ems on the above list. For example, the same 
ing rnicroburst situation will be flown using 
seved different -lay options. and differences in the 
pilots' hianhg of the situation will be observed. 
Active line pilots who are cunently flying 
EFliSfldCequipped aircraft will be recruited 
for this 8 ent 'Ilhe flying portion of the 
exprim be performed in conjunction with an 
elecmic approach plate experiment. which will 
allenwe the anticipation caused by re 
dens. Scenarios with non-threatening microbursts 
peesent ;and with no microbursts present will also be 
includecl, to prevent the subjects from developing a 
sysaernaric way of handling microburst threats. 
5. Conclusions 
Issues related to the development of an alerting 
sysgern lor microbursts in the terminal area have been 
smed. Two specific issues have been 
idenciZication of a g o d  criterion for mi 
mwment.  and 2) evaluation of graphical cockpit 
-lays for presentation of microburst alerts. 
caused by rnicrobursts. However. the "mean shear," 
computed by dividing the t a d  &vergence by the 
distance over which it occurs, con-elates very well with 
&tion. Also. application of the "F- 
results obtained h m  runs using two different autopilot 
models were not significantly different. 
An experiment has been designed to evaluate 
options for graphical cockpit -lay of microburst 
graphical display options. 
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